Heterogeneous Service Platform Direct Sales, Reselling or Hybrid Channel Structure Selection
GUO Songbo，AI Xingzheng，HE Haojia，TANG Hua
1. Taiyuan University of Technology, Taiyuan, China; 2. University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, China; 3. Xihua University, Chengdu, China; 4. Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu, China
Abstract This study constructs a game model involving manufacturers and platforms, considering heterogeneous service quality efforts and two-part tariff commission contracts, to examine the channel structure of heterogeneous service platforms and identify the conditions under which direct sales, reselling and a hybrid of both become the optimal choice for platforms, manufacturers and the system. The findings indicate that heterogeneous service platforms opt for the hybrid channel when the platform charges manufacturers a fixed management fee within a certain range. The formation of a hybrid channel through manufacturer invasion of the platform leads to increased wholesale prices and exacerbates the double marginalization effect. An increase in the manufacturer’s service quality effort coefficient can reduce service heterogeneity, resulting in lower wholesale prices and higher sales in the hybrid channel, thereby encouraging manufacturers to improve service quality. By designing an effective two-part tariff commission contract, the hybrid channel achieves a Pareto optimum.
GUO Songbo,AI Xingzheng,HE Haojia等. Heterogeneous Service Platform Direct Sales, Reselling or Hybrid Channel Structure Selection[J]. Chinese Journal of Management, 2024, 21(11): 1688-.
