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| An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Retailers’ Price Inflating Behavior Considering Social Learning under Emergencies |
| WANG Ke，MA Xuan，ZHANG Quanxin |
| Shanghai University, Shanghai, China |
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Abstract Concerning the price-inflating behavior of retailers under emergencies, the social learning theory is innovatively introduced to construct an evolutionary game model to explore the impact of social learning and related factors on system evolution through numerical simulation. The results show that as the intensity of social learning increases, the social learning effect has a greater impact on retailers’ price-inflating decisions, thus prompting more retailers to inflate prices. However, the threshold of initial participation proportion that leads retailers to evolve towards price inflating decreases with the increase of social learning intensity. Increasing the punishment and exposure of price inflation, avoiding the “laws fail where the violators are legion”, and increasing subsidies, significantly reduced the influence of the social learning effect on the evolutionary trend of the system, thereby prompting more retailers not to inflate prices.
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Received: 05 December 2022
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