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| Value-Added Service Investment and Operation Strategy of UGC Platform Considering Different Access Platform Situations |
| ZHU Xingzhen，LI Li，HE Xiang，HU Jiao，ZHANG Hua |
| Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing, China |
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Abstract We discuss value-added service investment, ad placement levels, and content production fee pricing strategies for UGC (user generated content) platforms that consider different access platform scenarios for content generators. With the monopoly and duopoly competition models, we compare and analyze the operational strategies of platforms when content generators have single-platform access and two-platform access. The results show that: ① Platforms will increase the level of value-added service investment when the platform’s value-added service investment coefficient is large, while the platform’s advertising level and content production fee pricing will increase in a monopoly scenario and decrease in a competitive scenario. ② When the marginal value-added service investment cost is large, the platform will reduce the level of value-added service investment, while in a monopoly situation, the platform will reduce the level of advertising and content production fee pricing, which will not be affected in a competitive situation. ③ When content generators access both platforms, the platform has the lowest threshold for investment in value-added services in competitive situations.
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Received: 02 November 2021
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