|
|
|
| Evolutionary Game Decision in a Platform Supply Chain with Digital Empowerment |
| ZHAO Xiaomin，ZHAI Liying，JIANG Yin |
| Shanghai University, Shanghai, China |
|
|
|
|
Abstract Focusing on the context of digital empowerment of platforms, this study uses evolutionary game theory to construct a decision model for platform providers and enterprises, and explores the evolution mechanism between platform empowerment and enterprise innovation. The results show that: ①Setting reasonable empowerment service fees is the premise for platform providers and enterprises to reach the best strategy (empowerment, innovation); ②When the empowerment cost is low, platform providers and enterprises can realize the optimal equilibrium strategy (empowerment, innovation), even if the innovation risk of enterprises is high. However, when the empowerment cost and the innovation risk are high, both sides may fall into the worst strategy (no empowerment, no innovation). Therefore, if platform providers want to stimulate the innovation of participating enterprises by digital empowerment, they must have excellent ability and be able to find low-cost empowerment schemes; ③Considering the effect of the excess return from digital empowerment, platform providers should give priority to ensuring that participating enterprises obtain more excess returns, rather than giving priority to ensuring their own excess returns. That is, it is easier to achieve mutual benefit for platform providers who pay more attention to the growth of participating enterprises.
|
|
Received: 30 March 2022
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
