Influence of Valuation Adjustment Mechanism on Strategic Change of New Enterprise
HUANG Fuguang，LIU Zhenxuan，LI Xiwen，SHAO Yan
1.Nankai University, Tianjin, China；2.Hebei University of Economics and Business,Shijiazhuang, China；3.Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, Hangzhou, China
Abstract Based on the perspective of negative incentive pressure, we discuss whether the signing of valuation adjustment mechanism (VAM) encourages enterprises to make strategic change, and the moderating role of venture capital participation in governance. The results show that the signing of the VAM has significantly affected the strategic change of the enterprise. The higher the commitment performance, the stronger the motivation for the strategic change. The participation of venture capital in the board can play the “state recognition” and “appreciation” functions on the basis of obtaining “soft information”, which can alleviate the excessive strategic change behavior caused by VAM. The higher the reputation of venture capital, the greater the uncertainty, the stronger the negative moderating effect of the board’s participation. Further research found that strategic changes in the context of Valuation Adjustment Mechanism could not lead to performance improvement. After applying PSM matching and instrumental variable to alleviate the endogenous problem, the conclusion is stable.
HUANG Fuguang,LIU Zhenxuan,LI Xiwen等. Influence of Valuation Adjustment Mechanism on Strategic Change of New Enterprise[J]. Chinese Journal of Management, 2022, 19(5): 646-.
