Abstract Considering the common infringement problem in knowledge payment, this study constructs a three-stage game basic model and an extended model to investigate the provider’s optimal property protection strategy, pricing mechanism and quality decision. The results show that the optimal property protection strategy depends on the proportion of moral consumers and social pirate tolerance, and there is a “non-linear” relationship between it and the proportion of moral consumers. Meanwhile, the optimal knowledge price increases with the proportion of moral consumers and the intensity of property protection, and decreases with the increase of social pirate tolerance. Lastly, the optimal knowledge quality increases with the increase of property protection intensity, and decreases with the increase of social pirate tolerance. This study implies that, considering the “behavior effect” and “information effect”, the strictest intellectual property protection strategy is not necessarily optimal. Tension and relaxation is the rational choice.
MA Tao,LIU Zhengchi,CHEN Wenwu. Price and Quality Decision of Knowledge Payment from the Perspective of Property Protection Strategy[J]. Chinese Journal of Management, 2021, 18(12): 1822-.
