Abstract Different from the perspective of ownership structure, this study, based on network structure perspective, examines inhibitory effects of non-controlling shareholders’ network positions toward self-interested behaviors of controlling shareholders. Our results show that the non-controlling shareholders’ network positions have positive inhibitory effect on self-interested behaviors of controlling shareholders. As an important governance mechanism, institutional investor ownership has positive adjusting influence to above-mentioned causality. Through further researches, we find that inhibitory effect of non-controlling shareholders’ network position is significant to non-state-owned controlling shareholders’ self-interested behaviors, but it is not significant to state-owned controlling shareholders’ self-interested behaviors. Compared with poor legal environments, non-controlling shareholders’ network position can inhibit self-interested behaviors of controlling shareholders effectively in perfect legal environments.
MA Lianfu,DU Bo. The Influence of Shareholder Networks on Private Benefits Seeking Behaviors of Controlling Shareholder[J]. Chinese Journal of Management, 2019, 16(5): 665-.
