Abstract By analyzing the current environmental protection policies and the exceeding pollution emission standards enterprises’ actual situation, the influencing factors, such as profit rate, comprehensive tax rate，punitive penalty base and environmental protection supervision are integrated into the evolutionary game between local governments and exceeding pollution emission standards enterprises, are used to simulate exit decision process. It is concluded that, under different initial conditions, the enterprises adopt not exit strategy when the local government environmental protection inspectors are small; when the local government environmental protection inspectors are strong, the enterprises adopt exit strategy. When the initial state is certain, local governments can take measures such as reducing the profit margin of exceeding pollution emission standards enterprises, increasing the comprehensive tax rate, increasing the punitive penalty base, which will push the exceeding pollution emission standards enterprises to exit the market.
WANG Qiang,TAN Zhongfu,TAN Qingkun等. Exit Mechanism of Enterprises Exceeding Pollution Emission Standards under Environmental Protection Supervision[J]. Chinese Journal of Management, 2019, 16(2): 280-.
