Abstract By using a sample of state-owned enterprises of 2010~2014, from the perspective of “political promotion”, this research investigates the relationship between the career expectations of executives and state-owned enterprises risk. The results show that higher career expectations can reduce the risk level of state-owned enterprises; we also find agency efficiency represented by enterprise investment efficiency plays a partially mediated role in the relationship between career expectations and enterprises risk. In addition to the path of agency efficiency above, we also use anti-corruption storm as the shocking event to explore the agency cost path, it means that the career expectations can reduce the risk of enterprises by reducing the agency cost. Further research results also show that there is a two-way substitution effect between cash compensation and career expectations, which provides a theoretical basis for the state-owned enterprises to develop “explicit” and “hidden” incentive contract.
SHENG Mingquan,WANG Shun,BAO Qun. The Career Expectations of Senior Managers and the Risks of State Owned Enterprises[J]. Chinese Journal of Management, 2018, 15(11): 1647-.
