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Abstract Considering a closed-loop supply chain dynamic system composed of a leading manufacturer and a retailer, this paper studies manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price and recollecting effort strategies and retailer’s pricing strategy under manufacturer recollecting mode. Retailer’s fair utility with Nash bargaining point is constructed by Nash bargaining theory. Manufacturer’s wholesale prices and recollecting efforts strategies, and retailer’s pricing strategy, as well as their optimal value function are revealed by differential game theory. Results show that: As retailer’s fair concern increases, retailer will improve sale price, and manufacture will reduce wholesale price and its recollecting effort. As randomness increases, manufacture will reduce wholesale price and increase its recollecting effort in order to cope with uncertainty, and retailer will reduce sale price. Numerical results show that: the higher retailer’s fair concern is, the lower manufacturer’s optimal value function is, and retailer’s optimal value function is higher.
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Received: 31 July 2017
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