Government Subsidy Mechanism in Agricultural Supply Chain Considering Capital Constrain under Random Yield
HUANG Jianhui，YE Fei，LIN Qiang
1. South China University of Technology, Guangzhou, China; 2. Guangdong AIB Polytechnic College, Guangzhou, China; 3.Guangdong University of Technology，Guangzhou, China
Abstract Considering bankruptcy risks of the agribusiness firm in supply chain financing，three-phase stackelberg game model was set up to characterize the competition of government, retailer and agribusiness firm under government subsidy mechanism, and got the optimal government subsidy mechanism to realize the maximization of social welfare. In the meanwhile, the influence of government subsidy mechanism on the expected profit of both agribusiness firm and retailer, consumer surplus, and social welfare was achieved by comparing with those without government subsidy mechanism. It was found that, (1) when the probability of harvest year was large, and the ratio of the output rate for the harvest year and the output rate of the disaster year was small, the government should not provide subsidy; when the probability of harvest year was small, the government should not provide one hundred percent subsidy; otherwise, the government should provide one hundred percent subsidy. (2)Under the government subsidy mechanism, government subsidy could not only increase the customer surplus and social welfare, but also increase the expected profit of retailer; however, the agribusiness firm would only be benefited from the government subsidy as the output rate for the harvest year was large and the coefficient of sensitivity of price was small, or as the output rate for the harvest year was small.
2017, Vol. 14 
