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Abstract A competition model of closed-loop supply chain is constructed which consists of an original equipment manufacturer, an independent remanufacturer, and a common distributor. Manufacturers focus on both the profits of distributors who are in the vertical position of supply chain, and the profits of remanufacturer who are in the horizontal position of supply chain, that is say, manufacturer is a bidirectional fairness concerns. This study uses game theory to analyze the impact of the horizontal and vertical fairness concerns coefficient on pricing strategy of closed-loop supply chain. The results show that vertical fairness concerns behavior of manufacturer does not necessarily reduce distributor’s bargaining power, and horizontal fairness concerns of manufacturer does not necessarily increase distributor’s bargaining power; wholesale price of new product is most heavily affected by fairness concerns behavior of manufacturer first, sales price of new product second, wholesale price of remanufactured product third, and sales price of remanufactured product the last.
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Received: 16 October 2015
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2016, Vol. 13 
