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Abstract To address the moral hazard and adverse selection problems caused by the double information asymmetry of streamers’ sale efforts and influence in the live streaming commerce supply chain, this study constructs an incentive contract model under information asymmetry based on principal-agent theory by considering the bargaining power of streamers, and proposes contract conditions to discriminate the actual type of information and induce the streamer to improve sales efforts. It is shown that the brand supplier has to pay a certain amount of extra information rent for the high-influence streamer under the asymmetry of type information. At this time, the brand supplier should increase the slotting fee of the high-influence streamer and keep the commission rate unchanged, while the commission rate of the low-influence streamer is appropriately reduced and the slotting fee of the low-influence streamer depends on the situation. When the influence of the low-influence streamer is greater than a certain threshold, it should increase the slotting fee appropriately, otherwise reduce the slotting fee or adopt a pure commission model. Further, different prior beliefs about the influence of the streamer will directly lead to different configurations of optimal contracts.
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Received: 06 January 2022
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