Abstract Based on the data of the annual report risk information disclosure of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2000 to 2019, this study explores the managers’strategic disclosure of qualitative information and the motivation behind it. Empirical research shows that: when the company disclosures more risk information in their annual reports, they will make timing disclosures. Further research suggests that when the company faces higher financing constraints or has a refinancing plan, its motivation for timing disclosure is stronger. Moreover, the motivation of managers for timing disclosure is to reduce the negative market reaction brought by the disclosure of annual report risk information. The economic consequences test indicates that the timing of the managers’ disclosure will increase the degree of divergence between analysts on the earnings forecasts of listed companies, and lead to the long-term deviation of listed company stocks from their intrinsic value.
LYU Kefu,YU Mingyang,LIU Chen等. Research on the Impact of Risk Information on Timing Disclosure of Annual Reports[J]. Chinese Journal of Management, 2022, 19(3): 443-.
