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| Research on Online Advertising Timing Strategy and Offline Service Incentive Mechanism Based on Principal-Agent Model |
LI Xiang，LIU Yue |
| Nankai University, Tianjin, China |
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Abstract A game model considering online advertising and contract design is constructed to investigate the impact of different timing decisions on supply chain performance and offline services for the principal-agent behaviors of online retailers in offline experience stores. The study finds that: firstly, the level of upfront advertising by the online retailer is the same as that in the case of information symmetry, and there is a “substitution effect” on fixed payments. The advertising decision of the upfront contract model can be flexibly adjusted according to the contract parameters, thus creating a “differential effect”; secondly, the online retailer’s expected profits are better in the upfront advertising model than that in the upfront contract model, i.e., the “substitution effect” of the former is stronger than the “differential effect” of the latter; thirdly, the supply chain performance is related to the service efficiency of offline experience stores, and when the service efficiency is low, the upfront contract model can make the total profit of the supply chain better.
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Received: 21 August 2021
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