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| Optimal Incentive Contract for E-WASTE Take-Back with Retailers Self-Interested Behavior |
| REN Mingming，YANG Xue，LU Mengxin，YANG Yan，LIU Cong |
| 1.Henan Normal University, Xinxiang, Henan，China; 2. North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power, Zhengzhou, China |
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Abstract A optimal incentive contracts is formed for a producer commissioning a retailer to sell electronic products and to collect e-wastes under asymmetrical information, which involves two different collecting channels that one is consisting of individual recyclers not authorized by government and the other is a retailer with self-interested behavior, and environmental reputation. The conclusions demonstrate that the retailer could raise the level of its sales efforts even its suppliers do not offer incentive subsidies for its efforts in case the environmental reputation of retailer improving its product sales; When retailer’s self-intersted behavior can receive more unit profit, the manufacture should improve the level of performance incentive for the retailer, and the implementation of strict supervision and punishment measures can reduce the retailer’s self-interest behavior. When unit profit of retailer’s self-intersted behavior is small, the retailer still has illegal profit motives. Under the circumstances, the high performance incentive for retailer does not reduce its self-interest, but the high punishment or regulation can more effectively control its self-interest behavior. For channel intense competitiveness, increasing incentive subsidies for retailer take-back e-wastes can reduce self-interest motive, otherwise it is a must to synthesize multi-factor so as to determine the incentive subsidies.
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Received: 22 July 2015
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2016, Vol. 13 
