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Bidding Learning Model in Oligopoly Power Market with Incomplete Demand Information |
ZHANG Xin-Hua, YE Ze, LAI Ming-Yong |
1.Changsha University of Science & Technology, Changsha,China;2.Hunan University,Changsha,China |
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Abstract The demand information is incomplete to power producers in oligopoly power bidding markets.In the paper,bidding learning model is presented based on the discrepancy between subjective power price deduced by power producer and objective market clear price,whose fixed point and stability is explored analytically.Based on the aforementioned analysis,the stable region,bifurcation of the fixed point,Cournot equilibrium,and the average profits of power producers are studied respectively through numerical simulation to the power markets consisting of two producers.The results indicate that (i) unique fixed point of the learning model coincides with objective demand function,(ii) the power producer can find the objective demand function and attain the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in stable regions and (iii) in chaos state,producers gain more or less profit than its Cournot profit and there is a possibility that a new Nash equilibrium deviated from the Cournot point will be appear.
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Received: 04 September 2008
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