This paper studies the XBRL standardization diffusion among the stakeholders based on Stackelberg model. We analyze the adoption effects of XBRL on the main firm’s as well as its stakeholders’ transaction prices, trading volumes, market shares and profit. The results show that when there are part of stakeholders adopting XBRL, more trading volumes of the main firm will be realized. Transactions price, trading volume and market share of adopters will increase. When the number of early adopters is less, the profit of adopters will decrease; however when the number of adopters is large enough, the profit will increase. In contrast, the transactions price, trading volume, market share and profit will decrease for the stakeholders who did not adopt XBRL. An interesting outcome we found is that a partial adoption by the stakeholder base is optimal for the main firm. That is, there are an optimal number of adopters for the mail firm to obtain the maximization of profit.
赵现明, 张天西, 孙晓东. 基于XBRL的财务信息标准博弈分析[J]. J4, 2011, 8(2): 273-.
ZHAO Xian-Ming, ZHANG Tian-Xi, SUN Xiao-Dong. Game Analysis of Financial Information Standard Based on XBRL. J4, 2011, 8(2): 273-.