Based on game theory,four different kinds of models were used,including, complete information static game,complete information dynamic one,incomplete information static one,incomplete static one, and incomplete dynamic one.It was found that under the complete information,the optimum choices for the managers′ immoral behavior depended on the probability of the supervision of the managers by owners; under the terms of the incomplete information,the managers would take the best response to the tactics of the owner when their being immoral.
李燕萍, 杨艳. 企业经营者“道德风险”激励的博弈分析[J]. J4, 2004, 1(3): 324-.
LI Yan-Ping, YANG Yan. Analyis of the Motivation of Manages in Enterprises with “Moral Risk” by Game Theory. J4, 2004, 1(3): 324-.