Based on the transaction characteristics between the meatpacking enterprise and farmer in the food supply chain and the incomplete contract theory, the paper constitutes the shortterm cooperate transaction contraction model with the hypothesis that the both parties promise not to renegotiate. The conclusions show that the status of enterprises as test-agents is crucial to ensure the farmer to declare his type honestly in order to guarantee the special investment of both the parties optimized, and the limitation of the sub-game refined Nash equilibrium is that the payment function of enterprise must be a monotonous one so that the enterprise can tell the truth.
张春勋, 刘伟, 李录青. 食品供应链中企业与农户短期合作交易契约设计[J]. J4, 2010, 7(2): 243-.
ZHANG Chun-Xun, LIU Wei, LI Lu-Qing. The Design of Incomplete Transaction Contract between Meatpacking Enterprises & Farmers in the Food Supply Chain. J4, 2010, 7(2): 243-.