The principle-agent' competitiveness are important factors that influence the contract design and reward. We build up a principleagent model which shows that: i)the principle's competitiveness determines contract fixed income, and the surplus income together with competitiveness input strategy reaction, their preference between the competitiveness and reward, the marginal cost factor, and the agent's risk adverse factor; ii)the principleagent' competitiveness have asymmetrical effects on contract design, contract production, surplus income distribution , the input ratio of the principle's competitiveness and the input ratio of the agent's competitiveness, which depends on the principle-agent reward preference, the marginal cost factor, and the agent's risk adverse factor; iii) the asymmetry of principle-agent's competitiveness and the dynamic change of strategy reaction are basic causes of the conflicts of surplus distribution between the principle and the agent, and also the main causes that drive the dynamic adjustment, reward distributing and change of the contract efficiency; iv) the adjustment of contract reward should focus on changing the principleagent's competitiveness structure and strategy reaction.