Abstract：This study characterizes CEO internal alliances through the cumulative ratio of board and executive personnel changes since the CEO’s tenure, using Chinese A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2021 as the sample. The study finds that CEO internal alliances increase the likelihood of firms allocating financial assets and significantly exacerbate the degree of “shifting from real to virtual” within enterprises. Mechanism tests reveal that CEO internal alliances weaken the supervisory function of the board and the effectiveness of internal controls while strengthening the driving effect of compensation incentive mechanisms on financial arbitrage motivations. Heterogeneity tests also indicate that the impact of CEO internal alliances on corporate financialization becomes more pronounced under following circumstances: when regional marketization is higher and financial transactions are more active, when product market competition is stronger and cross-industry arbitrage opportunities are greater, when CEO compensation is lower and external pay gaps are wider, and when financing constraints are weaker. Additionally, although the corporate financialization behavior driven by CEO internal alliances enhances overall corporate performance, performance shows a declining trend after excluding financial gains.
胡珺，方祺. CEO内部联盟对企业金融化的影响研究[J]. 管理学报, 2025, 22(8): 1432-.
HU Jun，FANG Qi. The Impact of CEO Internal Alliances on Corporate Financialization. Chinese Journal of Management, 2025, 22(8): 1432-.
