Abstract：To explore the improvement scheme for a low-carbon supply chain’s operation performance under yield uncertainty and government subsidy, a game model consisting of one manufacturer with yield uncertainty and one retailer is constructed, where the manufacturer’s carbon emission reduction level is subsidized by the government. Based on comparison analysis of the low-carbon supply chain members’ equilibrium decisions and expected profits in the cases of decentralization, cost-sharing contract, and option contract, it is found that both cost-sharing contract and option contract can realize the Pareto improvement of the low-carbon supply chain under certain conditions. The numerical analysis further shows that, when the government subsidy coefficient and consumers’ low-carbon preference coefficient locate in different intervals, the low-carbon supply chain members’ preferences for the option contract and cost-sharing contract may be different.
蔡建湖，颜玲，李雨婷，方刚. 产出不确定环境下考虑政府补贴的低碳供应链博弈模型与契约设计[J]. 管理学报, 2025, 22(1): 167-.
CAI Jianhu，YAN Ling，LI Yuting，FANG Gang. Low-Carbon Supply Chain Game Model and Contract Design Considering Government Subsidy under Yield Uncertainty. Chinese Journal of Management, 2025, 22(1): 167-.
