Abstract：Based on two decision-making modes (retailer decision and cooperative decision) of environmental responsibility sharing, the supply chain game models of manufacturer and retailer jointly sharing environmental responsibility under three channel power structures are constructed. The influence of channel power and environmental responsibility cost sharing on supply chain operation coordination and environment is analyzed. The study shows that the retailer sharing a part of environmental responsibility costs is conducive to encouraging the manufacturer to improve green design level and the performance of itself and overall supply chain, but it is not always conducive to increasing the manufacturer’s profit. Moreover, compared to the retailer-leading and cooperative decision-making modes, under the manufacturer-leading mode and Nash equilibrium game, the optimal environmental responsibility cost sharing of the retailer decision-making mode is always lower and affected by the parameters related to green design. Regardless of the channel power structure, supply chain coordination of different environmental responsibility sharing modes can be achieved through fixed compensation fee contracts.
姚锋敏，闫颍洛，张晓莉，李玥. 考虑环境责任分担的供应链绿色设计决策及协调[J]. 管理学报, 2025, 22(1): 156-.
YAO Fengmin，YAN Yingluo，ZHANG Xiaoli，LI Yue. Green Design Decision and Coordination of Supply Chain Considering Environmental Responsibility Sharing. Chinese Journal of Management, 2025, 22(1): 156-.
