Abstract：Taking the A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2020 as a sample, this study empirically tests the impact of CSRC’s random inspection on enterprises innovation using a staggered DID model. The results show that compared with the enterprises that have not been randomly sampled, the innovation inputs and outputs of enterprises have significantly improved after CSRC’s random inspection, and this promotion effect mainly plays a role by reducing two types of agency costs and information asymmetry, indicating that fair law enforcement of CSRC’s random inspection can effectively promote enterprise innovation. Furthermore, heterogeneity analysis shows that the promotion effect of CSRC’s random inspection on enterprise innovation mainly exists in enterprises that are non-state-owned, have high financing constraints, face fierce market competition and are in areas with a high level of intellectual property protection. Finally, this study examines the impact of CSRC’s random inspection on the dual innovation of enterprises. The results show that CSRC’s random inspection plays a significant role in promoting both exploratory innovation and exploitive innovation.
马惠娴，刘文欣，吴烨伟. 证监会随机抽查制度对企业创新的影响研究[J]. 管理学报, 2024, 21(3): 408-.
MA Huixian，LIU Wenxin，WU Yewei. Research on the Impact of CSRC’s Random Inspection System on Enterprise Innovation. Chinese Journal of Management, 2024, 21(3): 408-.
