Study on the Governance Mechanism of Key Subordinate Executives to CEO Earnings Management
WU Fan，KUANG Xuewen，LI Jianhong，LUO Xiaomeng
1. Nanchang University, Nanchang, China; 2. Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, China；3.Southwestern University of Finance and Economics， Chengdu， China
Abstract：Based on the heterogeneity of preferences within the top management team, from a farsighted perspective of the interests of key subordinate executives, this study investigates the governance mechanism of key subordinate executives’ bottom-up internal governance on CEO’s real earnings management. The empirical study finds that the governance of key subordinate executives not only has a significant inhibiting effect on CEO’s earnings management, but also shows the Confucian spirit of “Should Do and Should Not”. When the CEO conducts downward earnings management, the key subordinate executives will selectively ignore it. When the external governance mechanism of the top management team fails, the key subordinate executives will conduct supplementary governance on the CEO’s earnings management. In addition, corporate business complexity and resource dispersion, as well as R&D investment and related transactions play a moderating mechanism and mediating mechanism role in the governance of key subordinate executives on CEO earnings management, respectively.
吴凡，况学文，李建红，罗晓萌. 关键下属高管对CEO盈余管理的治理机制研究[J]. 管理学报, 2023, 20(01): 127-.
WU Fan，KUANG Xuewen，LI Jianhong，LUO Xiaomeng. Study on the Governance Mechanism of Key Subordinate Executives to CEO Earnings Management. Chinese Journal of Management, 2023, 20(01): 127-.
