Abstract：In this study, a two-stage decision model in which the firm and the SRT exercise a jointly held real option of investing continuous R&D activities of a technological achievement is provided. The sequence move is the firm and the SRT committing to terms first and then the firm choosing the timing. Then the optimal entry timing and cooperation contract in which both parties can achieve win-win cooperation are derived, and the influence of effort commitments of the SRT and the firm on the optimal parameters are demonstrated. The results show that the higher the effort commitments of SRT and the firm in negotiation, the higher the firm’s optimal investment threshold in the investment decision. When facing different types (differentiated by maturity and relevance of technology) of SRTs, the firm can decide whether to include cash transfer clauses and provide what degree of non-financial innovation support services in the contract to affect the willingness and commitment of SRTs to cooperate, to ensure the cooperation works well and meet the technological needs.
王梦迪，郭菊娥，晏文隽. 企业需求驱动下技术成果持续研发的合作博弈与投资决策[J]. 管理学报, 2022, 19(11): 1703-.
WANG Mengdi，GUO Ju’e，YAN Wenjun. Cooperative Game and Investment Decision on Continuous R&D of Technological Achievements Driven by Firm’s Technological Demands. Chinese Journal of Management, 2022, 19(11): 1703-.
