Abstract：In order to effectively restrain miners’ violation behavior and promote coal mine safety production, this study constructs an evolutionary game model between miners and coal mining enterprises from the perspective of whether the punishment mechanism has spillover effect, and analyzes the evolutionary stability strategy of the system under the two punishment mechanisms. Taking the “safety partner” system of a coal mine in Pingdingshan City as an example, the research results verify the rationality of the existence of Bradley Curve from the institutional perspective, that is the spillover punishment system for group mutual management is better than the non-spillover punishment system for individual independent management. The implementation of spillover punishment system can make the miners change from the independent management stage of Bradley curve to the mutual management stage and thus reduce the probability of accident injury. Combined with the example, the optimal number of safety partner members of the coal mine is 2.
杨雪，田阳，宋爱峰，李浩文，刘银双. Bradley Curve视角下矿工违章行为的惩罚机制分析[J]. 管理学报, 2021, 18(8): 1238-.
YANG Xue，TIAN Yang，SONG Aifeng，LI Haowen，LIU Yinshuang. Analysis on Punishment Mechanism of Miners’ Violation Behavior from the Perspective of Bradley Curve. Chinese Journal of Management, 2021, 18(8): 1238-.
