Abstract：In this study, we consider the uncertainty of the macroeconomic cycle, the inside debt incentive and risk taking of CEO. Assuming that managers hold inside debt incentive, write-down contingent convertible bonds, this study analyzes the impact of this new compensation incentive on the risk taking motivation of the management and agency cost of the company. In this study, the closed-form solutions of bank securities value and managers’ compensation are obtained by applying the principles of stochastic control and dynamic programming. The analysis shows that inside debt incentive has obvious advantages over traditional compensation in restraining managers’ risk-taking motivation and reducing principal-agent costs. Especially in the economic recession, reasonable adjustment of the proportion of CEO’s inside debt holdings can completely eliminate managers’ risk-taking motivation and make managers more cautious and pay attention to the long-term interests of Banks.
赵志明，袁秋怡，周丽娟 . 经济周期波动下CEO内部债务激励和企业风险承担研究[J]. 管理学报, 2021, 18(4): 604-.
ZHAO Zhiming，YUAN Qiuyi，ZHOU Lijuan. CEO Inside Debt Incentive and Risk-Taking under Business Cyclical Fluctuation. Chinese Journal of Management, 2021, 18(4): 604-.
