Abstract：Considering that the consumers’ strategically delaying purchases influence the demand of a product service system and the length of service time during different periods, this study proposes a two-period game model among the manufacturer, the service provider and strategic consumers. The optimal pricing strategies of manufacturer and service provider are discussed under different proportions of service price, different strategic degrees of consumer behavior and different proportions of service valuation, respectively. Moreover, the impacts of the strategic degree of consumer behavior and the proportion of service valuation on equilibrium results are analyzed. The following results are obtained. When the proportion of service price is very low, the strategic degree of consumer behavior is very strong, and when the proportion of service valuation is very low, the manufacturer should adopt the first-period low and the second-period high pricing strategy, otherwise, the manufacturer should adopt the first-period high and the second-period low pricing strategy. When the strategic degree of consumer behavior is relatively strong and the proportion of service valuation is relatively low, the service provider should adopt the penetration pricing strategy, otherwise, the service provider should adopt the skimming pricing strategy. Finally, the service provider should adopt the loss leader pricing strategy in the first period under certain conditions.
张旭梅，王大飞. 基于消费者策略行为的产品服务系统两周期定价策略研究[J]. 管理学报, 2017, 14(12): 1870-.
ZHANG Xumei，WANG Dafei. Pricing Strategies for a Two-Period Product Service System Based on Strategic Consumer Behavior. Chinese Journal of Management, 2017, 14(12): 1870-.
