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J4  2016, Vol. 13 Issue (3): 454-    DOI:
物流与运作管理 最新目录| 下期目录| 过刊浏览| 高级检索 |
零售商具有买方抗衡势力时的竞争供应链纵向结构决策
李凯,李伟
东北大学工商管理学院
The Decision of Vertical Structure of Competitive Supply Chain When Retailers Have Countervailing Power
LI Kai,LI Wei
Northeastern University, Shenyang, China

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摘要 针对供应链中零售商买方抗衡势力不断增强的现象,构建了两个制造商和两个排他零售商组成的纵向市场结构模型,考察了买方抗衡势力条件下竞争供应链的纵向结构决策问题。研究发现:从制造商角度来说,买方抗衡势力和价格竞争程度共同决定了最优的纵向结构决策。当买方抗衡势力较大时,最优的纵向结构为纵向一体化;当买方抗衡势力较小时,最优的纵向结构取决于价格竞争程度。若竞争程度大于某一临界值,最优的纵向结构为纵向分离,反之,则为纵向一体化。然而,从供应链整体绩效的角度来说,最优的纵向结构始终为纵向分离,与买方抗衡势力以及竞争程度无关。
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关键词 买方抗衡势力 竞争供应链 纵向结构 纵向一体化 纵向分离    
Abstract:With regard to the increase of countervailing power in the supply chain, this study investigated the optimal decision of vertical structure of competitive supply chain under the background of countervailing power by constructing a vertical structure model consisting of two manufacturers and two exclusive retailers. It was found that from the manufacturers' point of view, the optimal decision of vertical structure depends on the countervailing power and the degree of competition. When the countervailing power is large, the optimal vertical structure is vertical integration; when the buyer countervailing power is small, the optimal vertical structure depends on the degree of price competition. If the degree of competition is greater than a threshold, the optimal vertical structure is vertical separation. Otherwise, it is vertically integrated. However, from the perspective of the performance of the whole supply chain, the optimal vertical structure is always vertical separation, regardless of the size of countervailing power as well as the degree of competition.
Key wordscountervailing power    competitive supply chain    vertical structure    vertical integration    vertical separation   
收稿日期: 2015-08-06     
基金资助:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71472032)
通讯作者: 李凯 (1956~),男,辽宁昌图人。东北大学(沈阳市 110169)工商管理学院院长,教授,博士研究生导师。研究方向为金融学与产业经济学。     E-mail: likai@mail.neu.edu.cn
引用本文:   
李凯,李伟. 零售商具有买方抗衡势力时的竞争供应链纵向结构决策[J]. J4, 2016, 13(3): 454-. LI Kai,LI Wei. The Decision of Vertical Structure of Competitive Supply Chain When Retailers Have Countervailing Power. J4, 2016, 13(3): 454-.
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