Abstract：In this study, we consider a two-sided market composed of an aggregation platform and an embedded third-party one. By constructing a non-cooperative game model, this study explores the optimal VAS investment level and the corresponding commission strategy of the two platforms when they provide VASs to their consumers individually or simultaneously. After comparing the equilibrium results, it is found that the VAS investment of the aggregation platform contributes to the profit of the third-party one, but the VAS investment of the third-party platform may damage the profit of the aggregation one. Although implementing VAS investment may not be the best option for a platform from a revenue perspective, the investment does help the platform expand its consumer base. In addition, the optimal decisions of the two platforms are influenced by factors such as platform service efficiency and the cross network effects.
黄晓琼，徐飞. 聚合模式下双边平台的增值服务投资及佣金定价策略研究[J]. 管理学报, 2024, 21(6): 919-.
HUANG Xiaoqiong，XU Fei. Value-Added Service Investment and Commission Pricing Strategies for Two-Sided Platforms under Aggregation Mode. Chinese Journal of Management, 2024, 21(6): 919-.
