Abstract：This study constructs three game models of the government-only audit, the government-focal firm independent audit, and the joint audit to explore the conditions under which the focal firm participates in the audit and the selection of the optimal audit mechanism when it participates in the audit. The results show that, firstly, when the government faces a high potential loss, the focal firm will not participate in the audit. When the government faces a low potential loss, the focal firm will participate in the independent audit if the supplier has a low compliance willingness, otherwise, it will participate in the joint audit. Secondly, compared to the government-only audit, the focal firm’s participation in the joint audit will improve the supplier’s compliance level, while in the independent audit, it will improve the compliance level only when the government faces a low potential loss. That is, the participation of the focal firm in the audit does not always improve the compliance level of the supplier. Furthermore, the impact of important parameters on the optimal strategies is also
investigated through numerical experiments.
赵连霞，刘佳，张小峰，周文泳. 三方博弈视角下供应商社会责任审查策略研究[J]. 管理学报, 2023, 20(9): 1380-.
ZHAO Lianxia，LIU Jia，ZHANG Xiaofeng，ZHOU Wenyong. Research on the Audit Strategies of the Supplier Social Responsibility from the Perspective of Tripartite Game. Chinese Journal of Management, 2023, 20(9): 1380-.
