Abstract：This study proposes an integration of the perspectives of resource dependence theory and agency theory to explore the relationship between interlocking directorate network and innovation investment. Based on System GMM estimation method and by using the A-share listed companies on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange during the period 2008~2015 as research samples, this study empirically investigates the impact of interlocking directorate network on enterprise innovation, the moderating effect of organization slack, as well as the differences of the moderating effects between different nature of property right. It was found that the network centrality positively correlates with R&D investment, while the structural hole has a positive promotion effect on innovation; organizational slack plays a significant moderating role on the relationship between positions of interlocking directorate network and innovation, and the moderating effects differ in the companies with different nature property rights, more specifically, organizational slack negatively moderates the effect of the network centrality on R&D investment but has positive role in the relations between the structural holes and R&D investment; the moderating effect of organizational slack on the relations between network centrality and innovation investment is stronger in the state-owned enterprises, and the moderating effect of organizational slack on the relationship between structural holes and innovation investment is stronger in the non-state-owned enterprises.
严若森，华小丽，钱晶晶. 组织冗余及产权性质调节作用下连锁董事网络对企业创新投入的影响研究[J]. 管理学报, 2018, 15(2): 217-.
YAN Ruosen，HUA Xiaoli，QIAN Jingjing. The Impact of Interlocking Directorate Network on Innovation Investment with the Moderation of Organization Slack and Nature of Property Right. Chinese Journal of Management, 2018, 15(2): 217-.
