Abstract：Considering the problem of information sharing in a supply chain consisting of two competing manufacturers and a common retailer, under the condition that the retailer has more demand information and the manufacturer cuts the cost, the equilibrium decision of the supply chain members is obtained under different information sharing strategies, and the optimal information sharing strategy of the retailer is obtained. The results indicate that information sharing mitigates double marginalization and increases the profit of supply chain members when the manufacturers are efficient in cost reduction. Without information contracting, demand information will be disclosed by the retailer voluntarily if and only if the manufacturers are efficient in cost reduction. With information contracting, the demand information is shared by the retailer if the manufacturers are efficient in cost reduction or the competition between them is intense. Numerical study indicates that the retailer is likely to share information only with the manufacturer that is more efficient in cost reduction when the two manufacturers have asymmetric cost reduction efficiency.
许明辉，孙康泰，杨东升. 竞争性制造商成本削减下的信息共享策略研究[J]. 管理学报, 2018, 15(12): 1872-.
XU Minghui，SUN Kangtai，YANG Dongsheng. Information Sharing Strategy with Competing Manufacturers under Production Cost Reduction. Chinese Journal of Management, 2018, 15(12): 1872-.
